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Digest: In re Marriage Cases 
Ryan D. Chavez 
Opinion by George, C.J., with Kennard, J., Werdegar, J., and Moreno, 
J. Concurring Opinion by Kennard, J. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 
by Baxter, J., with Chin, J. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by 
Corrigan, J. 
Issue 
Does California law reserving the union of marriage to opposite-sex 
couples and designating same-sex unions as 'domestic partnerships' violate 
the California Constitution? 
Facts 
On February 10, 2004, the Mayor of San Francisco directed city 
officials to adjust marriage licenses so that they could be issued to couples 
regardless of their sexual orientation. 1 By February 12, 2004, the city 
began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.2 Several legal actions 
followed. Two separate actions were filed in San Francisco Superior Court 
seeking an immediate stay and a writ prohibiting the issuance of marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples.3 The court denied the stay.4 The Attorney 
General and California taxpayers filed two petitions for an original writ of 
mandate by the California Supreme Court. 5 On March 11, the Court issued 
an Order to Show Cause on the original writ proceedings and directed the 
city to stop the issuance of marriage licenses while these proceedings were 
pending.6 Shortly thereafter, the City of San Francisco filed a writ petition 
and complaint in superior court, seeking declaratory relief under the theory 
that California statutes that limited marriage to opposite-sex couples 
1 In reMarriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 402 (Cal. 2008). This case is the result of six consolidated 
appeals: City & County of San Francisco v. State of Cal., No. CGC-04-429539, AI 10449 (S.F. City & 
County Super. Ct.); Tyler v. State of Cal., No. BS-088506, All0450 (L.A. County Super Ct.); Woo v. 
Lockyer, No. CGC-04-504038, A110451 (S.F. City & County Super. Ct.); Clinton v. State of Cal., No. 
CGC-04-429548, All0463 (S.F. City & County Super. Ct.); Prop. 22 Legal Def. & Educ. Fund v. City 
& County of San Francisco, No. CPF-04-503943, A II 0651 (S.F. City & County Super. Ct.); Campaign 
for Cal. Families v. Newsom, No. CGC-04428794, All0652 (S.F. City & County Super. Ct.). 
2 In reMarriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 402. 
3 !d. 
4 !d. 
5 I d. (citing Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco, S 122923, 2004 WL 473257; Lewis v. 
Alfaro, S 122865, 2004 WL 4 73258). 
6 !d. 
237 
238 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 11:237 
violated the California Constitution. 7 In addition, two similar actions were 
filed in superior court by several same-sex couples. 8 Several of these 
actions were eventually consolidated into a single proceeding, titled In re 
Marriage Cases. 9 While these cases were being consolidated, the 
California Supreme Court held, in Lockyer v. City and County of San 
Francisco, 10 that San Francisco officials had exceeded their power in 
issuing same-sex marriage licenses. 11 The Court issued a writ of mandate 
compelling officials to comply with the current statutory limitations and 
declared all same-sex marriage licenses already issued to be void. 12 
In In re Marriage Cases, the superior court held that California's 
current laws that limit marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the state's 
Equal Protection Clause. 13 The superior court evaluated these laws under 
strict scrutiny because they found that they infringed on a suspect class's 
(sex) fundamental right (to marry). 14 The court of appeal disagreed with 
the superior court's use of strict scrutiny. 15 The court of appeal found that: 
(1) the fundamental right to marry is limited to the right to marry a person 
of the opposite sex; (2) the suspect classification of sex was not at issue 
here; and (3) the classification of sexual orientation was not a suspect 
classification. 16 Under rational basis review, the court reversed the superior 
court's decision and found California's marriage laws constitutional. 17 
Analysis 
The Court considered: ( 1) which California laws limit marriage to 
opposite-sex couples; 18 (2) whether these laws violated a same-sex couple's 
fundamental right to marry; 19 (3) whether California's Domestic 
Partnership Act provided a similar and equal right to same-sex couples;20 
( 4) whether California's Equal Protection Clause applied to these laws, 
and, if so, what scrutiny should be applied;21 and, (5) under such scrutiny, 
whether California's laws regarding marriage were unconstitutionaJ.22 
7 !d. at 402-03. 
8 !d. at 403. 
9 !d. 
10 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004). 
11 In reMarriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 403. 
12 !d. 
13 !d. at 403-04. 
14 !d. at 404. 
15 !d. 
16 !d. 
17 !d. 
18 ld.at407-19. 
19 ld. at419-34. 
20 !d. at 434-35. 
21 ld. at 435-46. 
22 !d. at 446-53. 
"""" 
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1. Sections 300 and 308.5 of California's Family Code 
The Court considered whether Sections 300 and 308.5 of California's 
Family Code should be reviewed. The Court concluded that, "in light of its 
language and legislative history," Section 300 must be reviewed because it 
limited marriages performed in California to opposite-sex couples.23 The 
Court also concluded that Section 308.5 must be reviewed.24 Plaintiffs 
asserted that the language of Section 308.5 was ambiguous and related only 
to out-of-state same-sex marriages. 25 The Court disagreed and found that 
the language "reasonably must be interpreted to apply both to marriages 
performed in California and those performed in other jurisdictions."26 
2. All Individuals Have a Fundamental Right to Marry 
The Court concluded that the "California Constitution properly must 
be interpreted to guaranty [the right to marry] to all individuals and 
couples, without regard to their sexual orientation.'m The court of appeal 
had defined the right to marry under California's Constitution as a narrow 
right that gave opposite-sex couples the right to marry. 28 Applying 
California interracial marriage decisions, the Court disagreed and found 
that the right to marry should be viewed broadly as an individual right to 
"join in marriage with the person of one's choice."29 Although marriage 
plays an important role for society in many ways, the Court found the right 
to marry to be "a basic, constitutionally protected civil right," "protected 
from abrogation or elimination by the state."30 
In concluding that the right to marry applied to all individuals 
regardless of sexual orientation, the Court disagreed with the argument that 
California's traditional definition of marriage supported a limited view of 
the right to marry. 31 The Court emphasized that tradition alone is not 
enough to limit an individual's basic fundamental rights. 32 Similarly, the 
Court disagreed with the argument that the right to marry is directly linked 
· to family unions that procreate, stating that the "right to marry never has 
been viewed as the sole preserve of individuals who are physically capable 
of having children. "33 
23 !d. at 409-10. 
24 !d. at 41 0. 
25 !d. 
26 !d. 
27 !d. at 427. 
28 !d. at 429-30. 
29 In reMarriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 420-21 (citing Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (CaL 1948). 
30 !d. at 425-26 (citing Perez, 198 P.2d 17). 
31 !d. at 427-28, 452. 
32 !d. at 427-28. 
33 !d. at 431. 
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3. California's Domestic Partnership Act Provides Substantial Rights 
to Opposite-Sex Couples but it is not Equivalent to Marriage 
The Attorney General of California argued that, even though the Court 
concluded that the right to marry extends to same-sex couples, the current 
marriage statutes in California do not violate a same-sex couple's rights 
because California provides same-sex couples the same "personal and 
dignity interests" as opposite-sex couples via the Domestic Partnership 
Act.34 Earlier in its opinion, the Court acknowledged that the Domestic 
Partnership Act "generally afford[ s] same-sex couples the opportunity to 
enter into a domestic partnership and thereby obtain virtually all of the 
benefits and responsibilities afford by California law to married opposite-
sex couples."35 However, the Court found that the difference in names for 
opposite-sex and same-sex unions "pose a serious risk of denying the 
official family relationship of same-sex couples the equal dignity and 
respect that is a core element of the constitutional right to marry."36 
Therefore, the name difference alone is "potentially impinging upon the 
state constitutional right of same-sex couples to marry."37 
4. California's Marriage Laws Should be Reviewed under the State's 
Equal Protection Clause Using a Strict Scrutiny Standard 
Without much elaboration, the Court agreed with the plaintiffs that 
California's marriage statutes deny same-sex couples equal protection of 
the laws and therefore must be reviewed under the Equal Protection Clause 
of the California Constitution.38 The Court next reviewed whether it should 
apply a strict scrutiny or rational basis standard. 
Plaintiffs argued that the Court should apply a strict scrutiny standard 
of review under an equal protection analysis because the statutes (1) 
discriminate on the basis of gender (which is a strict scrutiny standard in 
California); (2) discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation; and (3) 
impinge on a fundamental right. 39 The Court reviewed all three of 
plaintiffs' arguments. First, the Court found that the statutes did not 
discriminate based on gender.40 The Court emphasized that the statutes 
treat people of gender equally by not allowing either gender to marry a 
person of the same-sex.41 Second, the Court agreed that the statutes 
discriminate based on sexual orientation.42 In this area of first impression, 
the Court held that sexual orientation is a suspect class that requires a strict 
34 /d. at 434. 
35 /d. at417-18. 
3o /d. at 434-35. 
37 /d. at 435. 
38 ld. 
39 !d. at 436. 
40 /d. 
41 ld. 
42 /d. at 439-41. 
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scrutiny standard of review under an Equal Protection Clause challenge.43 
The Court disagreed with the court of appeal's conclusion, which was 
based on a three-prong test that California has generally used to identify a 
suspect class, stating that "immutability" is not a required trait of a suspect 
class.44 Third, the Court agreed that the statutes "significantly impinge 
upon the fundamental interests of same-sex couples, and accordingly 
provide a further reason requiring that the statutory provisions properly be 
evaluated under the strict scrutiny standard of review. "45 
The Attorney General argued that the Court should consider using an 
intermediate scrutiny standard for classifications based on sexual 
orientation.46 The Court summarily disagreed, stating that "past California 
cases have not applied an intermediate scrutiny standard of review to 
classification involving any suspect (or quasi -suspect) characteristic. "47 
Unlike federal courts, California applies a strict scrutiny standard to 
classifications based on gender or sex.48 
5. Under a Strict Scrutiny Standard, California's Marriage Laws are 
Unconstitutional 
The Court concluded that California's marriage statutes did not pass a 
strict scrutiny standard ofreview.49 Applying the standard, the Court found 
that the state did not have a compelling interest for such classification and 
that the statute was not necessary to further any of the state's interests. The 
Court emphasized that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples "clearly is 
not necessary to preserve the rights and benefits of marriage currently 
enjoyed by opposite-sex couples," "permitting same-sex couples access [to 
marriage] will not alter the substantive nature of the legal institution of 
marriage," and permitting such access "will not impinge upon the religious 
freedom of any religious organization, official, or any other person .... "50 
The Court went so far as to re-emphasize the "real and appreciable harm 
upon same-sex couples and their children" when finding this classification 
failed the strict scrutiny standard of an equal protection challenge. 51 
Holding 
The Court held that Sections 300 and 308.5 of California's Family 
Code were "unconstitutional to the extent each statute reserves the 
designation of marriage exclusively to opposite-sex couples and denies 
43 !d. at 441-44. 
44 !d. at 442-43. 
45 !d. at 446. 
46 !d. at 443-44. 
47 !d. at 444. 
48 !d. 
49 !d. at 452. 
50 !d. at451-52. 
51 /d. at 452. 
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same-sex couples" designation of their unions as marriage. 52 To effectuate 
this holding, the Court struck the language in Section 300 that allowed 
marriage only "between a man and a woman" and voided Section 308.5.53 
Concurrence 
Justice Kennard filed a separate concurrence to "explain how the 
court's decision [] is consistent with Lockyer v. City and County of San 
Francisco[54 ]. ••• " 55 He emphasized that this case, by holding that same-
sex couples are deprived of their state constitutional equal protection 
guarantee, was just a "continuation of Lockyer," which had "made a legal 
determination that depriving same-sex couples of the right to marry was 
unconstitutional."56 Justice Kennard explained that, although on its face, 
the two decisions appear "inconsistent," Lockyer had not determined 
whether the California Constitution guaranteed a right of marriage to same-
sex couples.57 Rather, Lockyer had only "decided [] that local officials 
lacked authority to decide the constitutional validity of the state marriage 
statutes."58 Justice Kennard also noted that the constitutionality of denying 
same-sex marriage was not a "matter to be decided by the executive or 
legislative branch . . . but is instead an issue of constitutional law for 
resolution by the judicial branch . . . . The court today discharges its 
constitutional obligation by resolving that issue."59 
Dissents 
Justice Baxter filed a separate concurring and dissenting opm10n, 
joined by Justice Chin.60 He dissented regarding the majority's substantive 
holding on the basis that the "majority violates the separation of powers."61 
He reasoned that only one other state, Massachusetts, recognizes same-sex 
marriages; that California through the legislative process has already 
recognized same-sex unions and granted them the same substantive rights 
as opposite-sex marriages; and that, "[i]f there is to be a further sea change 
in the social and legal understanding of marriage itself, that evolution 
should occur by similar democratic means."62 He said: "The majority 
forecloses this ordinary democratic process, and, in doing so, oversteps its 
authority. "63 
52 !d. 
53 !d. at 453 (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE§ 300 (West 2008). 
54 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004). 
55 In reMarriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 453. 
56 !d. (citing Lockyer, 95 P.3d 459). 
57 !d. at 454 (citing Lockyer, 95 P.3d 459). 
58 !d. 
59 !d. at 455. 
60 !d. at 456. 
61 !d. 
62 !d. 
63 !d. 
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Justice Corrigan also filed a separate concurring and dissenting 
opinion.64 He dissented regarding the majority's substantive decision on 
the basis that the Court "can overrule a vote of the people only if the 
Constitution compels [it] to do so. [In this case], the Constitution does not 
[compel the Court to do so]. "65 He reasoned that the California Domestic 
Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003 provides same-sex couples 
with the same legal standing as opposite couples in their unions, and that 
such "parity does not violate the Constitution, it is in keeping with it."66 
Because all couples enjoy the same substantive rights, he said, the 
"traditional definition of marriage is [not] unconstitutional" and its review 
is not a matter of equal protection.67 
Legal Significance 
The Court's decision made California the second state to recognize 
same-sex marriages. However, such recognition did not last for long. The 
California voters passed, by a fifty-two to forty-eight percent vote count, 
Proposition 8 during the November 2008 elections.68 Proposition 8 
amended the California Constitution to define marriage as solely between a 
man and a woman. For better or worse, the legal battle over this charged 
issue continues: legal groups in favor of same-sex marriages have already 
filed lawsuits challenging the validity of Proposition 8. The ongoing legal 
maneuvering by both sides will continue, and such use of the process may 
affect, or at least spur lively debate over, the role of courts, legislatures, and 
the people in the political process.69 
64 /d. at 468. 
65 /d. 
66 /d. at 469. 
67 !d. at 468. 
68 For the latest vote count, see http://vote.sos.ca.gov/Retums/props/map 190000000008.htm. 
69 Chapman University's Journal of Law and Public Policy will discuss many of these issues 
during its February 2009 Symposium. For. more information, see http://www.lawschoolblog.org/ 
blog/2008/nov/04/after-effects-proposition-8-and-other-judicial-legislation-issues/. 
